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INTRODUCTION 
One century ago this year, the Supreme Court held in 
Hyde v. United States that venue in a federal conspiracy case 
lies in any district in which one or more overt acts occurred.1  
In a 5–4 decision over the impassioned dissent of Justice 
Holmes, who attacked the holding as diminishing an 
important constitutional right, the Court established an 
expansive interpretation of venue in conspiracy cases that 
has held to this day.2  The majority opinion in Hyde 
recognized that “to extend the jurisdiction of conspiracy by 
overt acts may give to the government a power which may be 
abused . . . .”3  Nonetheless, the Court held that a broad 
interpretation of venue was necessary to effectively prosecute 
multi-district conspiracies.4  As the Hyde majority predicted, 
its ruling has helped enable government prosecutions of large 
numbers of defendants charged with far-flung organized 
crime and other conspiracies at mass trials the Framers could 
probably not have predicted.5 
Justice Holmes’ dissent was equally prescient.  Noting 
that the Court’s jurisdiction now spanned the entire 
continent, Holmes examined numerous potential 
 
 1. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 363 (1912). 
 2. Id. at 391, 363. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. (“We must not, in too great a solicitude for the criminal, give him 
a kind of immunity from punishment . . . . And this may result if the rule 
contended for be adopted.  Let him meet with his fellows in secret, and he will 
try to do so; let the place be concealed, as it can be, and he and they may 
execute their crime in every state in the Union and defeat punishment in all.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 1924) 
(affirming Prohibition Act convictions of forty-two of sixty-three defendants); 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 393 (1927) (affirming 
convictions of twenty individuals and twenty-three corporations for violating the 
Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 315 U.S.C. §§ 1–7)); 
United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1939) (affirming conviction of 
one defendant and reversing conviction of another in an eighty-eight-defendant 
narcotics prosecution); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 116 (6th Cir. 
1956) (affirming convictions of fourteen defendants in a twenty-defendant 
narcotics prosecution); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 passim (5th Cir. 
1981) (affirming convictions of fifteen of twenty-three indicted RICO 
defendants). 
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ramifications of the Court’s holding, at one point describing 
the majority’s reasoning as “an amazing extension of even the 
broadest form of fiction.”6  Holmes observed that this fiction 
allowed for prosecution in a district in which the defendants 
had never come “within a thousand miles,” and he posited 
that “it might be at the choice of the government to prosecute 
in any one of twenty states in none of which the conspirators 
had been.”7 
As Holmes predicted, Hyde has enabled the government 
to prosecute criminal conspiracy cases in districts that have 
only the most tenuous connection to the alleged conduct and 
no connection to the particular defendants on trial.  One can 
only wonder how Justice Holmes would have reacted to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s panel decision in United States v. Shearer, 
a drug conspiracy case.8  In Shearer, venue was found to 
properly lie in the Middle District of Florida, even though its 
only connection to the crime was the inference that co-
conspirators not on trial and not even testifying as witnesses 
must have passed through that district, because two drove 
and one flew from the Miami area to New Orleans.9 
This Article argues that the Hyde standard for venue in 
federal criminal conspiracy cases provides insufficient 
safeguards for defendants who seek to assert their 
constitutional venue rights.  The Hyde standard for venue, 
broad in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, has become 
even broader in recent decades as courts have expanded the 
scope of what can constitute an “overt act” in furtherance of a 
conspiracy.10  Federal courts should modify the common law 
of venue by granting defense motions to transfer cases from 
districts that have no significant connection to the alleged 
criminal conspiracy.  This evolution of the common law would 
provide a needed counter-balance to the common law’s 
expansion in recent decades of what can constitute an overt 
act in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Absent such a 
countervailing change in the common law, venue—a 
safeguard that appears not once but twice in the 
Constitution—will remain essentially meaningless in 
 
 6. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 389 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 386, 389. 
 8. United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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conspiracy cases. 
Part II of this Article describes the Constitution’s venue 
protections, and Part III discusses the Hyde opinion.  Part IV, 
discusses the expansion in recent decades of what can 
constitute an “overt act” in furtherance of a conspiracy, which 
provides the basis for venue in most criminal conspiracy 
prosecutions.  Part V of the Article outlines the constraints on 
prosecution control over venue in criminal conspiracy cases, 
and the limits of those constraints.  Part VI, proposes a new 
judicial standard, beyond the mere commission of any overt 
act, for determining when motions to transfer venue should 
be granted.  Part VII is the Article’s brief conclusion. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S VENUE PROTECTIONS 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
The U.S. Constitution addresses venue in two separate 
provisions.  In Article III, titled “The Judicial Branch,” 
Section 2, titled “Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury 
Trials,” the relevant clause states that all criminal trials 
“shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State 
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but where 
not committed in any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or 
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”11  The 
Sixth Amendment, titled “Right to Speedy Trial, 
Confrontation of Witnesses,” contains a very similar but not 
identical clause: “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”12  As one 
leading scholar on venue in criminal cases aptly noted, the 
Article III clause is a venue provision (concerning the location 
of the trial), while the Sixth Amendment clause is a vicinage 
provision (concerning the location of the jury pool).13 
 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 13. “The Sixth Amendment preserves one of the oldest institutions of the 
common law—the jury of the vicinage.  Venue in modern law means the place of 
trial.  Vicinage means, not the place of trial, but the place from which the jury 
must be summoned.”  William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal 
Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 U. MICH L. REV. 59, 60 (1944). 
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Although venue and vicinage are different legal concepts, 
modern commentators have noted that “[t]his technical 
distinction has been of no real importance.”14  Jurors are 
selected from the district in which the trial is held.  “The 
distinction between the Constitutional venue and vicinage 
provisions has all but vanished.”15 
The historical background of the Constitution’s venue 
provisions is well documented.  In 1769, only six years before 
the start of the Revolutionary War, the British Parliament 
passed a law establishing a special commission to investigate, 
try, and adjudicate acts of alleged treason, under which the 
accused American colonists would be removed to Great 
Britain for prosecution.16  The colonies reacted by passing 
resolutions opposing the British law, such as the Virginia 
Resolves, and the first Continental Congress in 1774 declared 
that the colonists had the right to a jury trial of the vicinage, 
or location of the offense.17  Two years later, the Declaration 
of Independence denounced King George III “for transporting 
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses.”18  “By 
insisting on a right to a jury of a vicinage the colonists hoped 
to escape the hardship and danger of standing trial in some 
distant colony or in England.”19  As Justice Ginsburg observed 
in United States v. Cabrales, the framers remembered this 
affront to their rights by King George and wrote two separate 
provisions relating to the place of trial into the Constitution.20 
B. Policy Reasons for Constitutional Venue Protection 
The policy reasons for the Constitution’s venue 
protections are closely linked to their historical background of 
preventing the sovereign from transporting the accused to a 
 
 14. 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 301 (4th ed. 2009). 
 15. Andrew D. Leipold, How The Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1133–34 (2005) (citing United States v. 
Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (the difference between 
Constitutional venue and vicinage provisions “has never been given any 
weight”)). 
 16. Blume, supra note 13, at 63–64. 
 17. Id. at 64–66. 
 18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 19. Blume, supra note 13, at 66. 
 20. United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998) (venue for money 
laundering offense conducted entirely in Florida did not lie in Missouri, even if 
laundered funds were derived from unlawful Missouri drug sales). 
ULLMANN FINAL 3/13/2012  4:03 PM 
1008 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
distant location for trial.  In United States v. Cores, the 
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution’s “provision for 
trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the 
unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is 
prosecuted in a remote place.”21  Unfairness and hardships 
that can result from being tried in a remote place can include 
traveling great distances,22 separation from family and 
friends,23 the potential difficulty in securing character 
witnesses,24 limitation on the choice of counsel,25 a deleterious 
effect on one’s livelihood,26 and being tried in an alien 
environment in a tribunal favorable to the prosecution.27  As 
noted by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, the object of 
these venue provisions is to protect the accused “from being 
dragged to a trial in some distant state, away from his 
friends, witnesses, and neighborhood; and thus subjected to 
the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common 
sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or prejudices 
against him.”28  Indeed, the Department of Justice itself 
recognizes that “prosecution entails profound consequences 
for the accused and the family of the accused whether or not a 
conviction ultimately results.”29 
 
 21. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). 
 22. Id. at 410; Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 224 (1956) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949). 
 23. Johnston, 351 U.S. at 224; United States v. Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 865, 
879 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 24. Cores, 356 U.S. at 410.  The expense of transplanting character 
witnesses to a distant venue is often too great to warrant their use and, even if 
used, such witnesses are likely to have limited effectiveness before a foreign 
jury.  Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 878. 
 25. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); Radley, 558 F. 
Supp. 2d at 882. 
 26. Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 881. 
 27. See id.  These concerns were also described forcefully in the Virginia 
Resolves:  “Conveyed to a distant Land, where no Friend, no Relation will 
alleviate his Distresses or minister to his Necessities; and where no Witness can 
be found to testify his Innocence; shunned by the reputable and honest, 
consigned to the Society and Converse of the wretched and abandoned . . . .”  
Blume, supra note 13, at 64–65 (capitalizations left for emphasis). 
 28. United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861–62 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 925 (Carolina Academic Press reprint 
1987)).  Justice Story further noted: “Besides this; a trial in a distant state or 
territory might subject a party to the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps even 
to the inability of procuring proper witnesses to establish his innocence.”  Id. 
 29. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.001 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL],  
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On the other hand, a defendant who travels to a remote 
location to commit a crime cannot invoke the Constitution’s 
venue protections to preclude trial there.  As Judge Winter 
noted in United States v. Reed, discussed infra, “all appear to 
agree that the place where the acts constituting the crime 
occurred is a proper venue.”30  Justice Harlan argued that the 
basic policy of the Sixth Amendment would best be served by 
trying cases at the location of “witnesses and relevant 
circumstances surrounding the contested issues.”31 
As Judge Winter observed in Reed, although the concept 
of a right to trial in the vicinage was so highly regarded as to 
appear twice in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has yet 
to articulate a coherent definition of the underlying policies.32  
Consequently, courts have been required to balance the 
accused’s interest in avoiding prosecution in remote places 
with the competing interests of the courts, prosecutors, and 
witnesses. 
II. HYDE V. UNITED STATES: VENUE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
CONSPIRACY CASES 
A. The Hyde Opinion 
The common law of venue in federal criminal conspiracy 
cases is based almost entirely on Hyde.33  In that case, the 
government alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud 
the United States by fraudulently obtaining state lands in 
California and Oregon in order to exchange them with the 
federal government for more developable lands, which they 
planned to sell for a profit.34  The defendants were California 
 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27 
mcrm.htm#9-27.001. 
 30. United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480–81 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 31. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 32. Reed, 773 F.2d at 480. 
 33. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).  As Professor Norman 
Abrams wrote almost fifty years ago in what was then the seminal article on 
this topic: “Any discussion of the extent to which conspiracy venue differs from 
venue for other offenses must focus upon [the] rule which was first firmly 
established for the federal courts fifty years ago in Hyde v. United States, a 
landmark decision which merits careful study.”  Norman Abrams, Conspiracy 
and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions:  The Crime Committed 
Formula, 9 UCLA L. REV. 751, 754 (1962) (citations omitted). 
 34. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 351–52. 
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residents who had never previously set foot in the District of 
Columbia where they were tried.35  Two defendants—Hyde, 
who was one of the alleged principals in the conspiracy, and 
Schneider, who worked for Hyde—were convicted of 
conspiring to defraud the United States under then Section 
5440 of the Revised Statutes.36 
The defendants appealed their convictions based on a 
lack of venue in the District of Columbia.  The Supreme Court 
heard the case to determine whether under the Sixth 
Amendment venue in a criminal conspiracy prosecution lies 
only where the conspiracy was formed (i.e., the location of the 
unlawful agreement), or whether venue may lie at the 
location of any overt act.37  On appeal, the government argued 
that the defendants “formed” the conspiracy in the District of 
Columbia because they committed overt acts in furtherance of 
the conspiracy there.38 
 Neither the venue provision of Article III, Section 2 nor 
the vicinage provision of the Sixth Amendment contemplates 
that a crime could be committed in more than one 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, neither provision explicitly 
contemplates conspiracy as an offense.39  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court could write essentially on an empty slate in 
deciding where venue in a conspiracy case should lie when 
the conspiracy was entered into in one district and overt acts 
took place in another.40 
By a 5–4 margin, the Court held that venue could lie in 
either the district where the conspiracy was entered into or 
 
 35. Id. at 356–57.  Seven years earlier in Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 76 
(1905), the same defendants challenged, in a habeas corpus petition, their 
removal from California to the District of Columbia.  The Court held in a 6-3 
decision that the government’s allegation in the indictment that the conspiracy 
was entered into in the District of Columbia was sufficient to establish probable 
cause.  Id.  The dissent argued that removal was improper because there was no 
probable cause; there was conclusive evidence that the defendants were not 
present in the District of Columbia at the time the alleged conspiracy was 
formed and thus they could not be guilty of the crime charged.  Id. at 98. 
 36. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 355–56.  The two other alleged conspirators were 
acquitted.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 357. 
 38. Id. at 350. 
 39. Another intriguing facet of the venue and vicinage provisions of Article 
III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment is that both provisions assume a crime 
has been committed, as opposed to stating that venue lies where the crime or 
crimes are alleged to have been committed. 
 40. Id. at 360. 
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any district in which an overt act took place.41  After a review 
of the contemporary jurisprudence on conspiracy, the Court 
reasoned that while the agreement was the “gist” of the 
conspiracy offense, “an overt act was necessary to complete 
it.”42  Thus, a conspiracy transcends the time and location of 
the agreement and extends to the times and locations of all 
the overt acts.43  As the Court viewed it, conspiracy is a 
continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any district 
where it is begun, continued, or completed.44 
In upholding the convictions, the Supreme Court cited 
several policy considerations.45  The Court relied foremost on 
the need for the effective administration of the criminal 
justice system: “We must not, in too great a solicitude for the 
criminal, give him a kind of immunity from punishment 
because of the difficulty in convicting him—indeed, of even 
detecting him.”46  While noting the potential for oppression in 
the rule it established, the Court found the countervailing 
considerations more compelling: “It is not an oppression in 
the law to accept the place where an unlawful purpose is 
attempted to be executed as the place of punishment, and 
rather conspirators be taken from their homes than the 
victims and witnesses of the conspiracy be taken from 
 
 41. Id. at 357, 363. 
 42. Id. at 359. 
 43. The Court explained: 
We have held that a conspiracy is not necessarily the conception and 
purpose of the moment, but may be continuing.  If so in time, it may be 
in place, carrying to the whole area of its operations the guilt of its 
conception and that which follows guilt, trial and punishment.  As we 
have pointed out, the statute states what in addition to the agreement 
is necessary to complete the measure of the offense.  The guilty 
purpose must be put into a guilty act. 
Id. at 363. 
 44. Id. at 360. 
 45. Id. at 363–64. 
 46. Id. at 363.  According to the Court, a rule requiring the government to 
prove the location where agreement took place would unnecessarily hinder law 
enforcement.  Determining the geographic location of a meeting of the minds 
may often be a difficult and ambiguous proposition.  Id. at 361–62.  
Furthermore, a criminal could potentially avoid prosecution for conspiracy by 
effectively concealing the location of the agreement.  Id. at 363.  The Court 
stated that its decision “cuts through such puzzles and makes the act of the 
conspirator, which necessarily has a definite place without the aid of 
presumption or fiction, the legal inception of guilt, inculpating all and 
subjecting all to punishment.”  Id. at 362. 
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theirs.”47  In the Court’s view, the Hyde rule was entirely 
consistent with constitutional venue requirements—that the 
crime be prosecuted in the district where it was committed.48 
B. Criticism of Hyde by Justice Holmes and Justice Jackson 
The critique of expansive venue in criminal conspiracy 
cases begins with the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in 
Hyde.49  Speaking for four of the nine justices, Holmes 
categorically rejected the majority’s opinion.  He argued that 
while an overt act by any co-conspirator in any jurisdiction 
might suffice to expand the liability of all co-conspirators, this 
concept did not compel the majority’s holding that venue was 
proper wherever any co-conspirator had committed an overt 
act.  As Holmes explained, “[I]t does not follow that an overt 
act draws the conspiracy to wherever such overt act may be 
done, and whether it does so or not is the question before us 
now.”50 
Justice Holmes then argued that as the boundaries of the 
United States expanded, the importance of the Constitution’s 
venue protections correspondingly increased: 
With the country extending from ocean to ocean, this 
[venue] requirement is even more important now than it 
was a hundred years ago, and must be enforced in letter 
and spirit if we are to make impossible hardships 
amounting to grevious [sic] wrongs.  In the case of 
conspiracy the danger is conspicuously brought out.  Every 
overt act done in aid of it, of course, is attributed to the 
conspirators; and if that means that the conspiracy is 
present as such wherever any overt act is done, it might 
be at the choice of the government to prosecute in any one 
of twenty states in none of which the conspirators had 
 
 47. Id. at 363.  The companion case to Hyde, Brown v. Elliott, in deciding a 
similar venue challenge to a conspiracy conviction, added: “The Constitution of 
the United States is not intended as a facility for crime.  It is intended to 
prevent oppression, and its letter and its spirit are satisfied if where a criminal 
purpose is executed the criminal purpose be punished.”  Brown v. Elliot, 225 
U.S. 392, 402 (1912). 
 48. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 363. 
 49. Id. at 384–91. 
 50. Id. at 385.  In making that statement, Holmes assumed “so far as the 
statute of limitations is concerned, an overt act done anywhere with the express 
or implied consent of conspirators would show the conspiracy to be continuing 
between the parties so consenting, and leave them open to prosecution for three 
years from that date.”  Id. 
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been.  And as wherever two or more have united for the 
commission of a crime there is a conspiracy, the opening to 
oppression thus made is very wide indeed.51 
In Holmes’ view the majority’s ruling was “an amazing 
extension of even the broadest form of fiction.”52 
Although Justice Holmes’ dissent was forcefully argued, 
it had little or no effect.  Nearly forty years after Holmes’ 
dissent in Hyde, Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion 
that sharply criticized prosecutors for ignoring defendants’ 
constitutional venue protections.  Jackson’s concurrence in 
Krulewitch v. United States described conspiracy as an 
“elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense . . . [that] constitutes 
a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice.”53  
Jackson did not limit his critique to venue, but the remarks 
on venue were among his most pointed. 
An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right to 
trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  The 
leverage of a conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from 
the prosecution and reduces its protection to a phantom, 
for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been 
committed in any district where any one of the 
conspirators did any one of the acts, however innocent, 
intended to accomplish its object.  The Government may, 
and often does, compel one to defend at a great distance 
from any place he ever did any act because some accused 
confederate did some trivial and by itself innocent act in 
the chosen district.54 
Jackson went on to describe an extreme example: 
“Circumstances may even enable the prosecution to fix the 
place of trial in Washington, D.C., where a defendant may 
lawfully be put to trial before a jury partly or even wholly 
 
 51. Id. at 386–87. 
 52. Id. at 389.  Justice Holmes went on to posit what he saw as an extreme 
example of the potential for government abuse of expansive venue in criminal 
conspiracy cases where “an otherwise innocent overt act done in one state drew 
to itself a conspiracy in another state to defraud people in the latter, even 
though the first state would punish a conspiracy to commit a fraud beyond its 
own boundaries.”  Id. 
 53. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  Justice Jackson was particularly concerned with a prosecutor’s 
tendency to indict for conspiracy in lieu of a substantive offense.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 452–53. 
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made up of employees of the Government that accuses him.”55  
Justice Jackson’s concern about prosecutors fixing the place 
of trial in Washington, D.C., hardly is academic.  As noted 
below, venue for the offense of gathering, transmitting, or 
losing defense information is always authorized in the 
District of Columbia regardless of where the relevant conduct 
occurred.56 
In their attacks on expansive venue in criminal 
conspiracy cases, both Justice Holmes in Hyde and Justice 
Jackson in Krulewitch focused on the prosecution’s power to 
force a defendant to stand trial in a “remote” location, in 
seeming disregard of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
be tried by a jury of “the State and district where the crime 
shall have been committed.”  As the Justices noted, the 
consequences of this power include both personal hardship to 
the defendant57 and the prosecution’s ability to choose the 
venire.58 
Writing in 1962—50 years after Hyde, eighteen years 
after the enactment of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
(“Rule”) 21(b),59 and thirteen years after Krulewitch—
Professor Abrams stated: “The tendency [in conspiracy cases] 
has been to dispose of objections to venue based on overt acts 
alone by citation of Hyde.”60  Indeed, after a thorough 
examination of the relevant precedent, Abrams concluded 
that the concerns of the four dissenters in Hyde had gone 
virtually unnoticed.61  A more recent scholarly work noted the 
heightened potential for prosecutorial abuse in decisions 
about where to bring criminal conspiracy cases.62 
 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See infra note 90. 
 57. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 386 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 58. See Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 59. FED. R. CRIM P. 21(b).  See infra Part IV.B (gives courts the power under 
certain circumstances to transfer venue on motion of the defendant). 
 60. Abrams, supra note 33, at 759. 
 61. Id. at 759–60. 
 62. “The risks of a defendant [in a conspiracy prosecution] being tried in a 
remote location are greater than in most cases, since venue in a conspiracy 
prosecution can be laid in any district in which any conspirator performed any 
of the overt acts to accomplish its object.”  WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, § 
226 (citing Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 218 (2005)).  These risks 
are compounded by the usual risk of prejudice from joining many defendants in 
one case.  Id. 
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There does not appear to be any federal statute that 
places greater constraints on prosecutors’ ability to select 
venue in any criminal conspiracy case than the test set forth 
in Hyde.  As discussed in the next two sections of this Article, 
the expansion in recent decades of what can constitute an 
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy, when combined with 
this lack of constraints, has given prosecutors enormous 
control over the selection of venue in criminal conspiracy 
cases. 
III. EXPANSION OF WHAT CAN CONSTITUTE AN OVERT ACT IN 
FURTHERANCE OF A CONSPIRACY 
Over the past several decades, a series of federal appeals 
court rulings has expanded the scope of what can constitute 
an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy.  These rulings 
often arose in the context of whether an element of the 
offense had been satisfied, or whether a statute of limitations 
defense was applicable.  When they arose in the context of a 
venue challenge, they were frequently disposed with brief 
citation to Article III, the Sixth Amendment, and Hyde.  One 
effect of the convergence of these rulings is that conspiracy 
prosecutions have been allowed to proceed in districts that 
have essentially no connection to the charged conduct. 
It has been established, for example, that the overt act 
providing the basis for venue in a federal criminal case need 
not have been committed by the defendant63 or any co-
defendant at trial.64  Venue is also proper in any district in 
which an overt act occurs, even if the commission of an overt 
act is not an element of the offense.65  The conspirator who 
committed the overt act need not even be named in the 
indictment.66  Nor does the defendant need to know “where  
. . . or if . . . the overt act was committed.”67  Indeed, it need 
not even be foreseeable that an overt act would be committed 
 
 63. E.g., United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1997).  See also WRIGHT & 
HENNING, supra note 14, § 303 (citing Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 94 and Angotti, 
105 F.3d at 545). 
 64. See United States v. Molt, 772 F.2d 366, 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 65. See Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 218 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 252 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 
U.S. 392, 402–04 (1927)). 
 66. Angotti, 105 F.3d at 545. 
 67. Id. 
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in the district where the charges were brought.68 
It has also become accepted law that lawful conduct or 
“trivial”69 acts can constitute an overt act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.70  Thus, the fact that a co-conspirator drove 
through the district,71 or placed a phone call to someone in the 
district72 will suffice to establish venue there.  Flying over a 
judicial district in the course of the conspiracy will suffice to 
establish venue there.73  Indeed, the fact that an airplane 
flying over the district was occupied solely by government 
agents does not defeat venue, unless “there [is] an indication 
that its route had been significantly out of the ordinary  
. . . .”74 
When more than one of the above circumstances appears, 
the venue for a federal conspiracy prosecution can have 
almost no connection to either the defendant or the alleged 
unlawful conduct.  In United States v. Shearer, a drug 
conspiracy case, a cooperating witness testified that a co-
conspirator told him that electronics for a boat to be used to 
smuggle marijuana had been driven to New Orleans from a 
location near Miami.75  There was also testimony that another 
non-testifying co-conspirator had flown from Miami to New 
Orleans, and that the flight path would necessarily pass over 
the Middle District of Florida.76  There was no evidence that 
Shearer was present at any time in the Middle District of 
Florida.77  On that record, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
venue in that district was proper.  The court noted that all 
prior cases finding venue based on flights passing over a 
district involved the pick-up or delivery of contraband.78  
Nonetheless, the court held that the government established 
venue, because it required only proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence that an overt act in furtherance on the 
 
 68. Id. (citing United States v. Tannenbaum, 934 F.2d 8, 12–13 (2d Cir. 
1990)). 
 69. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452–53. 
 70. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States, 275 F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1960) (“an 
overt act in itself may be a perfectly innocent act standing by itself”). 
 71. United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 72. United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (cases cited). 
 73. United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 74. United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 75. Shearer, 794 F.2d at 1550. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1546–50. 
 78. See id. at 1551. 
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conspiracy had been performed in the district where the case 
was prosecuted.79 
All of the above-noted cases expanding the scope of what 
can constitute an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy 
post-date the Hyde decision.  Many of them were decided in 
contexts other than a challenge to venue, such as whether the 
charge was time-barred by a statute of limitation.  This 
precedent enables prosecutors to bring criminal cases in 
jurisdictions that have only the most tenuous connection to 
the defendant or the charged criminal conduct. 
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON PROSECUTION CONTROL OVER VENUE IN 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES, AND THE LIMITS OF THOSE 
CONSTRAINTS 
At least two legal checks exist on federal prosecutors who 
might seek to bring conspiracy cases in districts far from the 
site of a defendant’s alleged conduct.  First, to the extent that 
a defendant simultaneously faces conspiracy and substantive 
charges, venue must lie for both offenses.80  Second, Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) gives courts discretion to 
grant a defendant’s change-of-venue motion “in the interest of 
justice.”  However, both of these legal checks have significant 
limitations.  In theory, the Justice Department could impose 
additional limits on prosecutors who seek to bring charges in 
districts removed from defendants’ conduct, but current policy 
imposes no such limits. 
A. Joint Trial of Conspiracy and Substantive Charges 
Venue must lie for both the conspiracy charge and the 
substantive offense when both are tried together.81  However, 
this legal check has limited benefit to defendants, for at least 
three reasons.  First, venue for many substantive offenses is 
itself expansive.  For example, there are many federal 
criminal statutes that prohibit “use of the mails” in 
 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Leipold, supra note 15, at 1136 (citing United States v. Corona, 34 
F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that proper venue for conspiracy and the 
underlying substantive crime is the location of the substantive crime); United 
States v. Walden, 464 F.2d 1015, 1020 (4th Cir. 1972) (“trial ought to be held at 
the place of commission of the substantive offense”)). 
 81. See Corona, 34 F.3d at 881. 
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connection with various activities.82  The phrase “use of the 
mails” has been interpreted to include any location where the 
item mailed was sent, received or traveled through during the 
mailing process.83  Perhaps more relevant today, wire fraud 
offenses are similarly broad.84  Racketeering offenses under 
18 U.S.C. § 1959 are also subject to very broad venue, 
prosecution being proper anywhere the racketeering 
enterprise has significant operations.85  And, not surprisingly, 
drug distribution offenses have been subject to very broad 
venue, including locations where the drug activity could have 
an effect.86 
Second, prosecutors frequently bring conspiracy charges 
without adding a substantive offense.  A review of the 2008 
statistics from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center 
indicates that federal prosecutors brought 15,297 conspiracy 
charges against defendants in 2008 under 21 U.S.C. § 846, 
the drug manufacturing and distribution conspiracy statute, 
while the combined number of substantive charges brought 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 was 9282.87  These statistics suggest 
that at least 6015 drug defendants indicted in 2007, and 
probably a significantly higher number, were charged only 
with conspiracy.88  It should be noted here that the two most 
 
 82. These include the distribution of obscene or crime-inciting materials (18 
U.S.C. § 1717 (2011)), certain sexually oriented materials (18 U.S.C. § 1735 
(2011)), and materials that incite a riot (18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2011)).  United States 
v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 83. Brennan, 183 F.3d at 147. 
 84. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2011). 
 85. See United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cabranes, 
J., dissenting). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 419 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(prosecuting defendant for distribution of marijuana in Minnesota even though 
he was arrested for attempting to sell drugs in California); United States v. 
Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (subjecting Dallas residing 
defendant to Tennessee venue because the drugs sold were intended for 
Tennessee). 
 87. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Federal Criminal Case Processing 
Statistics, http://fjsrc.urban.org/ (data downloaded March 19, 2009).  In 2007, 
14,770 defendants were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, whereas 10,220 
defendants were charged under § 841, suggesting that, in 2007, at least 4550 
defendants were charged only with conspiracy.  Id.  In 2006, 15,208 defendants 
were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, whereas 10,409 defendants were charged 
under § 841, suggesting that, in 2006, at least 4800 defendants were charged 
only with conspiracy.  Id. 
 88. For each defendant who was charged with more than one substantive 
offense, the total number of defendants charged with one or more substantive 
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widely used criminal conspiracy statutes do not have separate 
venue provisions.89  At least two federal conspiracy statutes 
do have separate venue provisions, and in both cases 
Congress has expanded venue beyond the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Hyde.90  There does not appear to be any federal 
statute that places greater constraints on the prosecutor’s 
ability to select venue in any criminal conspiracy case than 
the test set forth in Hyde. 
Third, in multi-defendant cases, prosecutors can 
nonetheless bring some substantive charges by limiting them 
to defendants whose alleged substantive crimes occurred in 
the district of trial.  For example, in United States v. 
MacKenzie, the government charged four executives and eight 
lower-level managers of a pharmaceutical company with 
violating the general conspiracy statute.91  Although the 
company had its headquarters in Illinois and many 
defendants never worked in Massachusetts, the case was 
brought in the District of Massachusetts, the home office of 
the prosecutors who investigated the case.  Prosecuting the 
case in Massachusetts led to the somewhat anomalous result 
that only two sales managers (who worked in Massachusetts) 
were charged with substantive offenses, while the four 
executives and six other sales managers faced no substantive 
charges.92 
 
offenses decreases further below 9282.  Id. 
 89. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2011) (general conspiracy statue); 21 U.S.C. § 846 
(2011) (drug manufacture and distribution conspiracy statute). 
 90. The federal money laundering statute contains a venue provision which 
provides that: “A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under this 
section or section 1957 may be brought in the district where venue would lie for 
the completed offense under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act 
in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place.”  18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2) 
(2011).  Similarly, venue for espionage  begun or committed outside the United 
States, including conspiracy offenses, may always be brought in the District of 
Columbia, as well as “in any other district authorized by law.”  18 U.S.C. § 3239 
(2011) (establishing venue for 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794 offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 
793(g) (2011) (“[g]athering, transmitting or losing defense information”); 18 
U.S.C. 794(c) (2011) (“[g]athering or delivering defense information to aid 
foreign government”). 
 91.  Superseding Indictment at 3–5, 21–22, United States v. MacKenzie, No. 
01-CR-10350-DPW (D. Mass. July 16, 2002).  Author represented one of the 
sales manager defendants. 
 92. See id. at 21–22, 69–85.  Ultimately, all twelve of these defendants were 
either acquitted or the charges against them were dismissed.  Verdicts, United 
States v. MacKenzie, No. 01-CR-10350-DPW (D. Mass. July 14, 2004). 
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The above-described factors explain why existing venue 
provisions for substantive offenses place only limited 
constraints on the power of federal prosecutors to choose 
venue for criminal conspiracy cases.  In theory, Rule 21(b), 
discussed in the next section, should provide significant 
constraints on the exercise of this power.  In practice, judges 
have decreased their use of Rule 21(b) at the same time that 
prosecution control over venue has increased through the 
expanded definition of “overt act” discussed above in Part IV 
of this Article. 
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), approved by 
Congress in 1944, gives judges the power to transfer cases 
“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the 
interest of justice,” upon motion of the defendant.93  When 
applied in conjunction with Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 14, which allows for severance of defendants in 
multi-defendant cases, Rule 21(b) allows the court to transfer 
a particular defendant’s case to a more appropriate venue.94 
In the initial decades after Rule 21(b) was adopted, 
courts frequently granted transfers of criminal cases under 
the rule, even when the transfer resulted in a severance of 
defendants and therefore more than one trial.95  Most of these 
 
 93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). 
 94. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951) 
(venue transferred from Nebraska to Oklahoma, because, inter alia, defendant 
was “quite certainly a man of modest means” and a Nebraska trial “would 
involve him in vastly greater expense than he would incur in a trial in 
Oklahoma”); United States v. Amador Casanas, 233 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D.D.C. 
1964) (transferring wire fraud counts from D.C. to Puerto Rico, where 
defendants resided, and removing non-transferable counts from court’s calendar 
until transferred counts were disposed of); United States v. Jessup, 38 F.R.D. 
42, 50 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (transferring charges against two defendants from 
Tennessee to Mississippi, where those defendants resided, even though result 
would be separate trial against third defendant); United States v. Aronoff, 463 
F. Supp. 454, 460–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (transferring conspiracy and other 
charges against two defendants from New York to Michigan, where these 
defendants resided, despite government argument that result would be an 
additional multi-week trial); United States v. Haley, 504 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (transferring RICO conspiracy and other charges against seven 
indigent defendants from Pennsylvania to Georgia, where they resided, based 
primarily on “economic hardship accruing to defendants by virtue of attending a 
lengthy trial far from home”); United States v. Daewoo Indus. Co., 591 F. Supp. 
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decisions relied heavily on the financial, emotional, and 
practical hardship to the defendants of facing trial far from 
their homes.96  In recent decades, however, Rule 21(b) 
motions have almost always been denied.97  One federal court 
has noted “a trend in recent years away from granting 
transfers to mitigate the financial, emotional, or practical 
burdens of trial in a distant locale . . . . [T]he Court’s own 
research supports the observation that transfer under Rule 
21(b), although not unheard of, has been rare in recent 
years.”98  Citing Professor Wright, the court identified one of 
the rare exceptions being a 1990 case from the Western 
District of Washington where one of the major considerations 
supporting transfer was a possible volcanic eruption in 
Alaska.99 
In analyzing Rule 21(b) motions, courts typically cite 
Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., in which the Supreme 
Court noted but did not specifically endorse a ten-factor 
test100 that had been applied by the district court.101  This ten-
 
157, 165 (D. Ore. 1984) (transferring conspiracy and other charges from Oregon 
to California, finding that “[t]o try this case in unfamiliar jurisdiction with a 
very small Korean population, far away from family and friends who could 
provide financial and emotional support would exacerbate needlessly the fears 
and alienation that the defendants may feel”). 
 96. See United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D.D.C. 2005); cases 
cited infra note 98. 
 97. See WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, § 344.  An analysis of the 
reasons for this decline is beyond the scope of this Article; greater ease and 
declining cost of travel have been cited as two factors.  See infra note 98. 
 98. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86 (footnotes omitted).  The court noted 
that “the trend in recent years was hardly surprising when one considers the 
massive expansion of technology and the relative decline in costs for long-
distance travel over the past few decades.”  Id. at 86.  Certainly for defendants, 
such as actor Wesley Snipes, who filed “requests to travel out of the country for 
lengthy periods of time” while his trial was pending, arguments as to the 
burden of being tried far from home “ring hollow.”  United States v. Snipes, No. 
5:06-cr-22, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65432 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2007). 
 99. Id. (citing WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, § 344 n.29).  For a few 
more recent examples of Rule 21(b) transfers, see Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 865, 
870 (2008); United States v. Ferguson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (E.D. Va. 2006); 
United States v. Lima, No. 94-800, 1995 WL 348105, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 1, 
1995). 
 100. The ten factors include: 
(1) [L]ocation of corporate defendant; (2) location of possible witnesses; 
(3) location of events likely to be in issue; (4) location of documents and 
records likely to be involved; (5) disruption of defendant’s business 
unless the case is transferred; (6) expense to the parties; (7) location of 
counsel; (8) relative accessibility of place of trial; (9) docket condition of 
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factor test applied by the district court has been widely 
adopted.102  However, as Judge Posner has noted, the “open-
ended character of the standard in Rule 21(b) for a change of 
venue” gives the district courts essentially unbridled 
discretion.103 
Courts impose a relatively high burden on defendants 
who seek Rule 21(b) changes of venue.  In order to prevail in a 
Rule 21(b) motion, a “defendant carries the burden of showing 
substantial balance of inconvenience to warrant finding a 
transfer would be in the interests of justice.”104 
There are also significant pragmatic limitations on a 
defendant’s willingness to bring a Rule 21(b) motion.  In most 
instances a defendant who has been charged with a federal 
crime will want an attorney who practices frequently in the 
jurisdiction where the charge has been brought.  Also, for any 
defendant who cannot afford counsel, appointed counsel will 
almost always practice primarily or exclusively in the district 
 
each district or division involved; (10) any other special elements which 
might affect the transfer. 
Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1964). 
 101. Indeed, the issue decided by the Court in Platt was not the standard for 
transfers under Rule 21(b), but whether the Court of Appeals had authority to 
order a transfer or was limited to “determin[ing] the appropriate criteria” for 
transfer and “leav[ing] their application to the trial court on remand.”  Id. at 
244–45.  The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have 
authority to order a transfer of venue.  Id. at 245. 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007); In 
re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 387–88 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jordan, 
223 F.3d 676, 685 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 
934, 966 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 103. This is one of those areas in which the question for the court of appeals 
is whether, 
[T]he discretion granted to the district court has been exercised.  If it 
has been, it will be almost impossible to show that it has been abused–
let alone abused to such a degree as to meet the very high standard for 
review by means of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. 
In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
 104. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 533 (citing United States v. Benjamin, 623 F. Supp. 623 
(D.D.C. 1985)), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading 
_room/usam/title9/crm00533.htm; United States v. Oster, 580 F. Supp. 599 
(S.D. W. Va. 1984); United States v. Baltimore and O.R.R., 538 F. Supp. 200 
(D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Jones, 43 F.R.D. 511 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub 
nom. Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 
(1968).  However, for a recent example of a conspiracy case in which defendants’ 
Rule 21(b) motion was granted, see United States v. Auffenberg, No. 07-30042-
MJR (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2007) (Memorandum and Order). 
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where the case was brought.  Once the defendant has 
developed a working relationship with his or her attorney, 
transferring the case to a distant location would typically 
present significant obstacles to counsel, though it might be 
closer to where the defendant, the defendant’s family and 
most of the key witnesses reside.  Had the case initially been 
brought in a jurisdiction with which the defendant had more 
contact, this difficult choice would not be necessary. 
The decreasing reluctance of judges to grant Rule 21(b) 
motions, the virtually unbridled discretion inherent in the 
prevailing test for assessing such motions and the practical 
problems for a defendant in changing venue once the case has 
been brought all explain why Rule 21(b) has placed few 
constraints on the ability of prosecutors to select venue in 
criminal conspiracy cases. 
C. Justice Department Policy 
The U.S. Justice Department places various non-legally 
binding constraints on the exercise of prosecutorial power 
through the Principles of Federal Prosecution (“PFP”).  These 
principles “provide to Federal prosecutors a statement of 
sound prosecutorial policies and practices for particularly 
important areas of their work.”105  To the extent that the PFP 
addresses selection of venue in criminal cases, in essence it 
places no weight on a defendant’s constitutional venue 
protections. 
Venue is addressed in the section of the PFP titled 
“Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution in Another 
Jurisdiction.”106  The PFP identifies three factors to be 
considered in selecting a jurisdiction when a criminal case 
may be prosecuted in more than one jurisdiction, as follows: 
(1) strength of the jurisdiction’s interest in the case; (2) ability 
and willingness of prosecutors in the jurisdiction to prosecute 
effectively; and (3) the probable sentence upon conviction.107  
Protection of the accused’s constitutional venue rights is not 
mentioned in this discussion. 
Additional guidance for federal prosecutors can be found 
in the Justice Department’s Criminal Resource Manual.  The 
 
 105. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 29. 
 106. Id. at 9-27.240. 
 107. Id. 
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Criminal Resource Manual notes that “[i]nitial choice of 
venue is up to the prosecution,”108 and further states, “A 
defendant must demonstrate substantial inconvenience to 
nullify this prosecutive prerogative . . . .”109  This guidance, 
like the Principles of Federal Prosecution, does not suggest to 
prosecutors that they consider the defendant’s venue rights in 
deciding where to bring criminal charges.  It is therefore not 
surprising that federal prosecutors frequently bring 
conspiracy cases in jurisdictions that have only the most 
tenuous connection to the defendants who are being charged. 
V. ENHANCING CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE PROTECTIONS IN 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES: A PROPOSED NEW JUDICIAL 
STANDARD 
The common law of what constitutes an overt act in 
furtherance of a conspiracy has expanded to the point where 
almost any conduct in a judicial district, no matter how trivial 
or removed from the defendants on trial, can provide a basis 
for venue in that district.  Moreover, the most commonly used 
legal standard for assessing motions to transfer venue under 
Rule 21(b) is an essentially standard-less ten factor test that 
gives short shrift to a defendant’s constitutional rights. 
A century after Hyde, the time has come to adopt a new 
legal standard that gives defendants’ venue rights more 
standing.  Courts should apply a presumption in favor of 
transferring cases under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
21(b) in conspiracy cases that lack some modicum of 
connection between the charged conduct and the district of 
prosecution, beyond the mere commission of any overt act by 
an alleged conspirator.  Such a standard would be preferable 
to the current ten-factor test of Platt, which in essence 
provides little more than a completely malleable totality of 
the circumstances analysis. 
Precedent that could support an alternate standard to 
the Platt test in criminal conspiracy cases has already been 
developed in several circuits in the context of venue for 
substantive offenses.  Three circuits have applied a 
 
 108. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 531 (citations omitted), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00531.htm. 
 109. Id. 
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“substantial contacts” test to determine where venue is 
proper for certain substantive offenses and two other circuits 
have noted this standard with at least some apparent 
approval.110  The definition of what constitutes “substantial 
contacts” has certainly not been onerous for prosecutors.  
Indeed, the standard has at times been used to expand venue.  
The “substantial contacts” test therefore holds promise for 
creating a threshold for venue in conspiracy cases higher than 
the “any overt act” rule of Hyde without unduly burdening 
multi-district prosecutions. 
The requirement that a substantive offense must have 
“substantial contacts” with a district for venue to lie there 
first appeared in 1985 with the Second Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Reed.111  The prosecution in Reed involved 
deposition testimony taken in San Francisco pursuant to a 
civil action in the Southern District of New York.112  The 
defendant was indicted in the Southern District of New York 
for perjury and obstruction of justice for making false 
statements and offering fabricated documents.113  These 
counts were dismissed by the trial court for improper venue 
on the grounds that perjury could only be prosecuted where 
the oath was taken and that obstruction of justice could only 
be prosecuted where the acts constituting the obstruction 
occurred.114 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court, 
finding that venue was indeed proper in the Southern District 
of New York.  Before addressing the facts of the case, the 
Court engaged in a review of the constitutional policy of 
venue, noting: “The Constitution requires only that the venue 
chosen be determined from the nature of the crime charged as 
well as from the location of the act or acts constituting it, and 
that it not be contrary to an explicit policy underlying 
venue.”115  The Court also recognized that the Constitution 
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, the basic venue 
provision in the federal criminal rules, “are often of precious 
little aid in explaining how the locus of a crime is to be 
 
 110. See infra notes 121–23. 
 111. United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 112. Id. at 478. 
 113. Id. at 479. 
 114. Id. at 477–78. 
 115. Id. at 480. 
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determined.”116  Responding to this lack of any “single defined 
policy or mechanical test to determine constitutional 
venue,”117 the court in Reed adopted what it called a 
“substantial contacts” test to determine constitutional 
venue.118  The substantial contacts test considers: (1) the site 
of the defendant’s acts, (2) the elements and nature of the 
crime, (3) the place where the effect of the conduct occurs, and 
(4) the suitability of the district for accurate fact-finding.119  
The latter three factors “often give sites other than where the 
act occurred equal standing so far as venue is concerned.”120  
The Second Circuit subsequently applied the Reed substantial 
contacts test in United States v. Saavedra to determine the 
outer bounds of venue for offenses that are subject to venue in 
multiple districts.121 
Four Circuits have expressly adopted or cited with 
apparent approval the substantial contacts test set forth in 
Reed for determining where venue can lie for a substantive 
offense.122  The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only appeals 
court to have referenced the substantial contacts test in a 
criminal conspiracy case, reversing a drug conspiracy 
conviction on venue grounds.123  However, the reference to 
substantial contacts was dicta in that no agreement or overt 
act occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, where the 
defendant was indicted.  All of the relevant conduct and the 
 
 116. Id. at 479–80. 
 117. Id. at 481. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 122. See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(affirming venue in a wire fraud case in a district where the defendant was 
incarcerated when the plaintiff executed the scheme from prison even though no 
wires were used in that district); United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (affirming venue in Virginia for a witness retaliation conviction 
where the assault occurred in the District of Columbia but the case in which the 
victim previously testified was located in Virginia); United States v. Williams, 
788 F.2d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding venue proper in a bail jumping 
case, both in the district where bail was granted and where the defendant failed 
to appear); United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming venue in Wisconsin in attempted drug distribution case where the 
defendant purchased drugs in Arizona for resale in Wisconsin, but was arrested 
in Oklahoma while transporting the drugs). 
 123. United States v. Williams, 274 F.3d 1079, 1080 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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unlawful agreement occurred in Texas.124  Indeed, the only 
connection between the offense and Michigan was the 
statement of an undercover agent to the defendant that he 
intended to sell the drugs there.125 
From the defense perspective, applying the substantial 
contacts test to criminal conspiracy cases under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 21(b) could significantly enhance the 
venue rights of defendants facing conspiracy charges.  From 
the government’s perspective, however, requiring the 
prosecution to establish substantial contacts between the 
alleged conspiracy and the district of prosecution poses at 
least two potential obstacles to effective law enforcement. 
The first potential concern for federal prosecutors arises 
from the fact that many large conspiracy cases begin with the 
discovery of relatively minor criminal conduct.  For example, 
the arrest of a street-level drug dealer carrying a small 
quantity of cocaine may ultimately lead to a multidistrict or 
even international drug distribution conspiracy case.  If the 
prosecutors and agents who handled the initial arrest and 
patiently assembled a complex case were precluded from 
prosecuting the case in their home district, based on a judicial 
finding that the district lacked “substantial contacts” with the 
overall conspiracy, the result could well be added government 
expense and a less effective prosecution effort. 
The second potential obstacle for prosecutors arises from 
the vagueness of a substantial-contacts standard.  
Prosecutors may have trouble proving that a particular overt 
act occurred, but they have no difficulty understanding the 
concept.  In contrast, a prosecutor could find it difficult to 
determine whether one or more overt acts constituted 
“substantial” contacts. 
 Judging from the lack of legal challenges or expressions 
of prosecutor opposition to the substantial contacts test in 
substantive cases, neither of these potential problems should 
present a real obstacle to the government if courts define 
substantial contacts in conspiracy cases the way they have 
defined the term in substantive cases.  Moreover, even in the 
absence of a showing of substantial contacts by the 
prosecution, courts could allow the presumption in favor of 
 
 124. Id. at 1084. 
 125. Id. 
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transfer to be rebutted by other compelling circumstances. 
A common-sense application of the substantial contacts 
test to criminal conspiracy cases would make little or no dent 
in the Justice Department’s ability to effectively prosecute 
multi-district conspiracies.  Indeed, a strong argument exists 
that federal prosecutions should already be giving at least 
some formal credence to defendants’ venue rights, something 
that current Department policy does not consider.126  Surely 
defendants should receive greater protection than the current 
overt act test provides, given how the common law definition 
of overt acts has developed. 
CONCLUSION 
The century-old holding in Hyde, that venue in criminal 
conspiracy cases lies in any district in which one or more 
overt acts occurred, has greatly facilitated the prosecution of 
complex and geographically diverse conspiracies.  However, it 
has also subjected many defendants to prosecution in districts 
that have little or no connection to their alleged conduct, the 
conduct of their alleged co-conspirators, or their place of 
residence.  Protection of the defendant’s constitutional venue 
rights seems to have fallen between the cracks in some 
federal criminal cases.  Indeed, one goal of this Article has 
been to remind not only prosecutors but also defense 
attorneys that venue rights are of constitutional magnitude 
and should not be regarded merely as some pro forma hurdle 
that the prosecution inevitability will surmount. 
A century after Hyde, the time has come to establish a 
presumption in favor of transferring venue under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) in conspiracy cases where 
the government fails to establish some modicum of connection 
between the charged conduct and the district of prosecution, 
beyond the mere commission of one overt act by any 
 
 126. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.240 (2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm.  
The relevant PFP section, titled Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution 
in Another Jurisdiction, should be amended to require that prosecutors to 
consider the defendant’s constitutional venue rights in additional to the three 
currently noted factors.  See id.  This simple change would help ensure that 
prosecutors give some consideration to each defendant’s venue rights in 
criminal conspiracy cases. 
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coconspirator.  This evolution of the common law would 
enhance protection of defendants’ constitutional venue rights 
without impeding the effective administration of justice. 
